Four Things To Demystify Boycotts

§ 45(a)(1), consistent with the First Amendment; rather, the issue is how the government may determine which boycotts are illegal. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), for example, we invalidated a state program under which taxpayers applying for a certain tax exemption bore the burden of proving that they did not advocate the overthrow of the United States Government. 2495, 2501, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). “Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 434, 437, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). But a group’s effort to use market power to coerce the government through economic means may subject the participants to antitrust liability. N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. The Petition and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment guarantee citizens the right to communicate with the government, and when a group persuades the government to adopt a particular policy through the force of its ideas and the power of its message, no antitrust liability can attach. Two well-established premises lead to the ineluctable conclusion that when applying the antitrust laws to a particular expressive boycott, the government may not presume an antitrust violation under the per se rule, but must instead apply the more searching, case-specific rule of reason.

Such a weighty conclusion requires wholly new social theories in addition to new theories of economic development. 2) Whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the union conduct was not primary activity outside the scope of § 8(b)(4)(A). See Irvine v. People of State of California, 347 U.S. The Machinists’ contention that their activity was only legitimate primary activity is foreclosed by the Board’s contrary finding on the basis of conflicting evidence. The controversy was not rendered moot simply because, after the filing of the charges and before the complaint issued, picketing had ceased and the Machinists had entered into a collective bargaining agreement containing a no-strike clause. 1303, and that the Board was not justified in concluding that, under all the circumstances, it was desirable to add the sanction of its order to whatever agreement the parties had reached. 1246, where the Board was admonished not to apply the policies of its statute so single-mindedly as to ignore other equally important congressional objectives. But the fact that the carrier’s consent is not effective to relieve him from certain obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act does not necessarily mean that it is ineffective for all purposes, nor should a determination under one statute be mechanically carried over in the interpretation of another statute involving significantly different considerations and legislative purposes.

It was not concerned to determine, as an abstract matter, the legality of hot cargo clauses, but only to enforce whatever duty was imposed on the carriers by the Interstate Commerce Act and their certificates. The Commission recognized that it had no general authority to police such contracts, and its sole concern was to determine whether a hot cargo provision could be a defense to a cargo that the carriers had violated some specific statutory duty. Since the cannot effectively consent, there is, under § 8(b)(4)(A), a ‘strike or concerted refusal,’ and a ‘forcing or requiring’ of the carrier to cease handling goods just as much as if no hot cargo clause existed. The Court of Appeals thoughtfully analyzed this problem and concluded, I believe correctly, that there could be no antitrust violation absent a showing that the boycotters possessed some degree of market power that is, the ability to raise prices profitably through economic means or, more generally, the capacity to act other than as would an actor in a perfectly competitive market. In Part V of its opinion, however, the Court maintains that under the per se rule the Federal Olymp trade commission (simply click for source) Commission (FTC or Commissioner) could find the boycott illegal because it might have implicated some of the concerns underlying the antitrust laws.

Next comes the critical part. The settlers attempted to retain the culture they had brought from the United States and for the most part did not integrate with the native societies. In any particular case, it may be difficult to untangle these two effects by determining whether political or economic power was brought to bear on the government. I cannot countenance this reasoning, which upon examination reduces to the Court’s assertion that since the government may prohibit airplane stunt flying and reckless automobile driving as categorically harmful, see ante, at 433-434, it may also subject expressive political boycotts to a presumption of illegality without even inquiring as to whether they actually cause any of the harms that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. He may have failed in his obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act, but there clearly is no violation of § 8(b)(4)(A); there has been no prohibited inducement of employees.